Cornish Town v. Evan O. Koller and Marlene B. Koller, husband and wife : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1988
Cornish Town v. Evan O. Koller and Marlene B.
Koller, husband and wife : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
George W. Preston; Harris, Preston, Chambers and Wilmore; M. Byron Fisher; Fabian and
Clendenin, P.C.; Attorneys for Appellants.
Jody K. Burnett, Jerry D. Fenn; Snow, Christensen and Martineau; Attorneys for Respondent.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Town v. Koller, No. 880121.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2026
45.9 
•
S 9
 .-r 
DOCKET 
U T ,H SUPREME w u -
BRIE6 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
CORNISH TOWN, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
vs 
Case No. 880121 
EVAN 0. ROLLER and MARLENE B, 
ROLLER, husband and wife, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
ON APPEAL FROM THE DECISION OF 
THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE VENOY CHRISTOFFERSEN, DISTRICT JUDGE 
GEORGE W. PRESTON 
HARRIS, PRESTON, CHAMBERS 8. 
WILMORE 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 752-3551 
M. BYRON FISHER 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, P.C. 
12th Floor 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-8900 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Appellants 
JODY K BURNETT (A0499) 
JERRY D. FENN (A4035) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place 
Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
V 
*uv«i21988 
Clark. Suprxno Gxirt, Utah 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
CORNISH TOWN, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
vs. 
Case No. 880121 
EVAN 0. ROLLER and MARLENE B. 
ROLLER, husband and wife, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
ON APPEAL FROM THE DECISION OF 
THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE VENOY CHRISTOFFERSEN, DISTRICT JUDGE 
JODY R BURNETT (A0499) 
JERRY D. FENN (A4035) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place 
GEORGE W. PRESTON Eleventh Floor 
HARRIS, PRESTON, CHAMBERS & Post Office Box 45000 
WILMORE Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
31 Federal Avenue Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 752-3551 Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
M. BYRON FISHER 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, P.C. 
12th Floor 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-8900 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Appellants 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
BELOW 1 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
A. Nature of the Case 3 
B. The Course of Proceedings Below and 
Statement of Facts 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 9 
ARGUMENT 11 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING 
AS A MATTER OF LAW THE ISSUE OF PUBLIC USE 
AND NECESSITY 11 
A. The Standard of Review Proposed by the 
Appellants is Erroneous and is not the 
Appropriate Standard Here 11 
B. The Trial Court Appropriately Determined 
as a Matter of Law that Cornish Town had 
Made a Showing of Public Use and 
Necessity 13 
1. The Public Use Here Was Authorized 
by Statute 13 
2. The Taking by Cornish Also Met the 
"Necessity" Requirement 14 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO ALLOW 
DEFENDANTS TO SUBMIT THE ISSUE OF PUBLIC 
USE AND NECESSITY TO THE JURY 20 
-i-
POINT THREE 
THE ENACTMENT OF A TOWN ORDINANCE DID NOT 
CONSTITUTE THE TAKING OF ROLLERS' PROPERTY 
NOR SHOULD THE ENACTMENT DATE OF THE 
ORDINANCE BE THE VALUATION DATE OF THE 
PROPERTY ACTUALLY TAKEN EMINENT DOMAIN 22 
A. The Passage of Ordinance 81-1 did not 
Constitute a Compensable "Taking" of 
Rollers' Property 22 
B. The Valuation Date of the Property Taken 
by Eminent Domain was Appropriately 
Determined to be the Date of Service of 
Summons 28 
POINT FOUR 
CORNISH TOWN DID NOT ABANDON ANY OF ITS 
CLAIMS AND, THEREFORE, THE ROLLERS MAY NOT 
RECOVER ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS IN 
CONNECTION THEREWITH . 29 
A. The Statutory Language Mandates that 
The Rollers' Claim for Attorneys' Fees 
and Costs Should be Rejected 31 
1. The Statute Contemplates a Complete 
Abandonment of the Proceedings Which 
Did Not Occur in this Case 31 
2. The Cases Cited by The Rollers Involve 
a Different Statutory Framework and 
Thus are Not Applicable 34 
B. As a Matter of Policy, The Rollers' Demand 
for Attorneys' Fees and Costs Should Be 
Rejected 35 
POINT FIVE 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED EVIDENCE 
OF MINERAL RIGHTS 37 
POINT SIX 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED EVIDENCE OF 
THE VALUE OF HUNTING ACCESS PERMITS AS A SEPARATE 
ELEMENT OF COMPENSABLE DAMAGES 42 
-11-
POINT SEVEN 
COSTS, INCLUDING THE COSTS OF PREPARATION OF 
TRANSCRIPTS AND EXHIBITS, WERE PROPERLY NOT 
AWARDED 46 
CONCLUSION 48 
-iii-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Bountiful v. Swift, 
535 P.2d 1236 (Utah 1975) 15,18,21,22 
C. F. Lytle Co. v. Clark, 
491 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1974) 25 
County of Hawaii v. Sotomura, 
55 Hawaii 677, 517 P.2d 57 (1973), cert. 
denied on another issue, 419 U.S. 872 (1974) . . 38 
County of Kern v. Galatas, 
200 Cal. App. 2d 353, 19 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. 
App. 1962) 34 
Detroit International Bridge Co. v. American Seed Co., 
249 Mich. 289, 228 N.W. 791 (1930) 32 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 
272 U.S. 365 (1926) 26 
Fairbanks v. Metro Co., 
540 P.2d 1056 (Alaska 1975) 16 
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. 
County of Los Angeles, U.S. , 
107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987) 23 
Frampton v. Wilson, 
605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980) 46,47 
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 
239 U.S. 394 (1915) 26 
Hatanaka v. Struhs, 
738 P.2d 1052 (Utah App. 1987) 46 
Hill v. Hartog, 
658 P.2d 1206 (Utah 1983) 12 
Honolulu v. International Air Service Co., 
63 Hawaii 322, 628 P.2d 192 (1981) 38,39 
Independent School District v. Gross, 
291 Minn. 158, 190 N.W.2d 651 (1971) 35 
Kent Island Joint Venture v. Smith, 
452 F. Supp. 455 (D. Md. 1978) 25 
-IV-
Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc, v. De Benedictis, 
480 U.S. 470, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987) 
Los Angeles v. Abbott, 
129 Cal. App. 144, 18 P.2d 785 (1933) . . . . 
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 
477 U.S. 340, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986) 
Martineau v. State Conservation Commission, 
54 Wis. 76, 194 N.W.2d 664 (1972) 
Merced Irrigation District v. Woolstenhulme, 
93 Cal. Rptr. 833, 483 P.2d 1 (1971) 
National American Life Ins. Co. v. Bayou Country 
Club, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 417, 403 P.2d 26 
(1965) 
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 
U.S. , 107 S. Ct 
Ogden City v. Stephens, 
21 Utah 2d 336, 445 P.2d 703 (1968) 
Olson v. United States, 
292 U.S. 246 (1934) 
Penn Central Trans. Co. v. City of New York, 
438 U.S. 104 (1978) 
Perry v. Thomas, 
82 Utah 159, 22 P.2d 343 (1933) 
Postal Tel. Cable Co. of Utah v. Oregon S.L.R. Co., 
23 Utah 474, 65 P. 735 (1901) 
Provo City v. Cropper, 
28 Utah 2d 1, 497 P.2d 629 (1972) 
Redevelopment Agency of Roy v. Jones, 
743 P.2d 1233 (Utah App. 1987) 
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Barrutia, 
526 P.2d 47 (Utah 1974) 
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Mitsui 
Investment, Inc•, 522 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1974) 
-v-
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Tanner, 
740 P.2d 1296 (Utah 1987) 12,21 
Salt Lake County v. Ramoselli, 
567 P.2d 182 (Utah 1977) 15 
State Road Commission v. Larkin, 
27 Utah 2d 295, 495 P.2d 817 (1972) 11 
State v. 7.026 Acres, 
466 P.2d 364 (Alaska 1970) 43 
State v. Jacobs, 
16 Utah 2d 167, 397 P.2d 463 (1964) 38 
State v. Kunimoto, 
62 Hawaii 502, 617 P.2d 93 (1980) 37 
State v. Noble, 
6 Utah 2d 40, 305 P.2d 495 (1957) 45 
State v. Ouzounian, 
26 Utah 2d 442, 491 P.2d 1093 (1971) 45 
Stratford v. Wood, 
1 Utah 2d 251, 358 P.2d 80 (1961) 47 
United States v. 1,606.00 Acres of Land, 
698 F.2d 402 (10th Cir. 1983) 40 
United States v. 3,218.9 Acres of Land, 
619 F.2d 288 (3rd Cir.) cert, denied, 449 U.S. 
872 (1980) 40 
Utah Department of Transportation v. Fuller, 
603 P.2d 814 (Utah 1979) 16,17 
Utah Dept• of Transportation v. Jones, 
694 P.2d 1031 (Utah 1984) 38 
Utah State Road Commission v. Friberq, 
687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984) 28 
Williams v. Hyrum Gibbons & Sons Co., 
602 P.2d 684 (Utah 1979) 16,18 
Williamson Co. Regional Planning v. Hamilton Bank, 
105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985) 28 
-vi-
Wm. E. Russell Coal Company v. Board of County 
Commissioners of Boulder County, 
129 Colo. 330, 270 P.2d 772 (1954) 41 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann 6 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-4 (1986) 2,14 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-15 (1986) 14 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-18 (1986) 2,14 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-4 (1986) 14 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (1987) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-1(3) (1987) 1,13 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-16 (1987) 31,34,37 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-2(1) (1987) 7,30,36 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-4 (1987) 13 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-11 (1987) 28 
California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1268.510 & 
1268.610 35 
OTHER 
1 Nichols an Eminent Domain, § 4.11[3] at 4-184, 
4-185 17 
-vii-
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The appellants Evan 0. and Marlene B. Roller ("Rollers"), 
appeal from certain decisions of the Honorable VeNoy 
Christoffersen, District Judge, in connection with the condem-
nation action brought by Cornish Town ("Cornish") entitled 
Cornish Town v. Evan 0. Roller, et al., Civil No. 25058, First 
Judicial Court of Cache County, State of Utah, to condemn 
certain property of the defendants in connection with improve-
ments to and the creation of a protection zone around a 
municipal water system. This court has jurisdiction of this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (1987). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT STATUTORY 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
In addition to the relevant statutory provisions set forth 
by the Rollers in their brief, which are not repeated here, the 
court's attention is directed to the following: 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-1(3) (1987). This Section 
states: 
78-34-1. Uses for which right may be exercised. 
Subject to the provisions of this chapter, the 
right of eminent domain may be exercised in behalf of 
the following public uses: 
(3) public buildings and grounds for the use of 
any county, city or incorporated town, or board of 
education; reservoirs, canals, aqueducts, flumes, 
ditches, or pipes for conducting water for the use of 
the inhabitants of any county or city or incorporated 
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town, or for the draining of any county, city or 
incorporated town; the raising of the banks of streams, 
removing obstructions therefrom, and widening, deepen-
ing or straightening their channels; roads, streets 
and alleys; and all other public uses for the benefit 
of any county, city or incorporated town, or the 
inhabitants thereof. (Emphasis added.) 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-4 (1986). This Section states: 
10-7-4. Water supply — Acquisition — Condemnation 
— Protest — Special election. 
The board of commissioners, city council or board 
of trustees of any city or town may acquire, purchase 
or lease all or any part of any water, waterworks 
system, water supply or property connected therewith, 
and whenever the governing body of a city or town 
shall deem it necessary for the public good such city 
or town may bring condemnation proceedings to acquire 
the same; provided, that if within thirty days after 
the passage and publication of a resolution or 
ordinance for the purchase or lease or condemnation 
herein provided for one-third of the resident tax-
payers of the city or town, as shown by the assessment 
roll, shall protest against the purchase, lease or 
condemnation proceedings contemplated, such proposed 
purchase, lease or condemnation shall be referred to a 
special election, and if confirmed by a majority vote 
thereat, shall take effect; otherwise it shall be 
void. In all condemnation proceedings the value of 
land affected by the taking must be considered in 
connection with the water or water rights taken for 
the purpose of supplying the city or town or the 
inhabitants thereof with water. (Emphasis added.) 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-18(1) (1986). This Section 
states: 
10-8-18. Acquisition of water sources — Retainage 
escrow. 
(1) They may construct, purchase or lease and 
maintain canals, ditches, artesian wells and reser-
voirs, may appropriate, purchase or lease springs, 
streams or sources of water supply for the purpose of 
providing water for irrigation, domestic or other 
useful purposes; may prevent all waste of water flow-
ing from artesian wells, and if necessary to secure 
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sources of water supply may purchase or lease land; 
they may also purchase, acquire or lease stock in 
canal companies and water companies for the purpose of 
providing water for the city and the inhabitants 
thereof. (Emphasis added.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This action was commenced by Cornish Town to condemn 
approximately 100 acres of the Rollers1 property for the 
purpose of creating protection zones above the Griffiths and 
Pearson Springs (the "Springs") located on the Rollers' 
property and which provide culinary water to the residents of 
Cornish Town. Cornish also sought to condemn approximately 7 
acres of Rollers' property to provide rights-of-way for access 
to the Springs. 
B. The Course of Proceedings Below and Statement of Facts. 
Cornish filed this action in July, 1986 to condemn certain 
property of the Rollers through the statutory power of eminent 
domain. (R. at 1). In its original complaint, Cornish sought 
to condemn a fee simple in certain protection zones around the 
Springs. They also sought to condemn certain rights-of-way to 
provide access to the Springs. The only previous access was to 
walk into the Springs along a pipeline. This did not give 
Cornish the ability to bring equipment in to repair and main-
tain the collection works. (Transcript, Hearing on Order of 
Immediate Occupancy, October 8019, 1986, [hereinafter "Tran-
script, Hearing"] p. 6-8). 
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Cornish Town initiated this action because the State Board 
of Health told Cornish to make necessary improvements and 
repairs to the Town water system, including reducing the level 
of nitrates in the spring water. (Transcript, Hearing, p. 
10-11). Cornish thereafter passed a resolution of condemnation 
to condemn the property in question. (Transcript, Hearing, p. 
15). Cornish determined that a protection zone around the 
Springs was necessary in order to try to control the nitrate 
problem. (Transcript, Hearing, p. 12). State water quality 
officials told Cornish that agricultural fertilization 
contributed to the high nitrate levels. (Transcript, Hearing, 
p. 14). 
Cornish filed a motion of immediate occupancy of the 
property on July 29, 1986. (R. at 11) The court held a 3-day 
hearing on October 8 through 10, 1986 during which the 
plaintiff put on evidence of a public use and necessity and 
defendants put on evidence attempting to show no such use. 
Contrary to defendants' assertion, the trial court considered 
the Rollers' evidence wherein they attempted to refute 
plaintiff's claim of public use and necessity. 
The court in reviewing the evidence found that there had 
been intermittent problems with Cornish's water supply in that 
it had failed to meet water quality standards. (Transcript, 
Hearing p. 455-456). The court noted that state water quality 
officials had made recommendations regarding the acquisition of 
a 1,500 ft. protection zone around the Springs. (Transcript, 
-4-
Hearing p. 456). The court noted that witnesses had indicated 
that the nitrate problem at the Springs had resulted from 
agricultural use. The trial court considered the facts set 
forth on pages 9 through 14 of Appellants' Brief and concluded 
that these facts did not rebut Cornish's evidence of public use 
and necessity. (See, e.g., Transcript, Hearing p. 450-460.) 
The court emphasized that Cornish had authority under the 
right of eminent domain to acquire property to protect their 
water system and that the statute authorized this condemnation 
proceeding. The court also held that, given the history of the 
problems of the Town of Cornish with its water system, the 
complaints made by the State as to water quality, the recommen-
dations by State agencies regarding an attempt to solve the 
problem and the fact that Cornish acted under these valid 
recommendations, the taking was necessary for a public use. 
(Transcript, Hearing p. 458). In connection therewith, the 
court made the following findings: "that there is sufficient 
testimony to show the necessity of something being done by 
Cornish to do something to their water supply so they can meet 
the requirements as far as adequate and pure water supply. 
That they have reviewed and selected this method and I do not 
find from the evidence that they acted unreasonably or that 
they acted in bad faith in doing so." (Transcript, Hearing p. 
460 [emphasis added]). Thus, the court concluded that Cornish 
did not act in bad faith and did not abuse its discretion in 
pursuing this condemnation action. 
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The court entered an order of immediate occupancy on 
December 16, 1986. (R. at 137). Thereafter, defendants filed 
a motion for partial summary judgment (R. at 416) to determine 
that the date of taking of the property condemned was 
September, 1981 at the time the town enacted Ordinance 81-1 (R. 
at 431). That motion was denied. (R. at 579). On February 
9-12, 1988 a jury trial was held before the Honorable VeNoy 
Christopherson, District Judge, First Judicial District Court. 
The jury awarded judgment on a special verdict of $59,670.00 
(R. at 640). Final judgment on this special jury verdict and a 
taking of perpetual easements and right-of-way was entered by 
the district court on May 13, 1988 (R. at 131) and an amended 
final judgment was entered June 13, 1988 (R. at 494). 
At the trial, the Rollers petitioned the court to hear 
evidence as to the claims of public use and necessity of the 
property being condemned. (Trial Tr., Vol. 1, p. 10.) The 
court denied the motion concluding that all issues as to public 
use and necessity were determined by the court at the hearing 
on the Order of Immediate Occupancy and that the court would 
not disturb the plaintiff's determination of the issues of 
public use and necessity. (Trial Tr., Vol. 1, p. 10.) On the 
morning of the first day of trial, the Rollers attempted to put 
on evidence regarding the value of deposits of minerals under-
lying the property condemned. Defendants did not previously 
raise a claim of valuable mineral rights by their pleadings or 
otherwise and never put Cornish on notice of this claim prior 
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to the morning of the first day of trial. (Trial Tr., Vol. 1, 
p. 4.) 
Upon learning of the Rollers' claim, Cornish moved to amend 
its pleadings to acquire only a perpetual easement. (Trial 
Tr., Vol. 1, p. 15.) This action was mandated by the relevant 
statute which provides that "where surface ground is underlaid 
with minerals . . . sufficiently valuable to justify extrac-
tion, only a perpetual easement may be taken over the surface 
ground over such deposits." Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-2(1) 
(1987). The court granted the motion to amend the complaint 
and denied the Rollers' motion to put on evidence as to the 
value of the underlying mineral rights. The court held that 
the assertion of the claim of mineral rights was untimely. 
(Trial Tr., Vol. Ill, p. 4.) Moreover, the court held that the 
issue of whether the Rollers had a right to extract the 
minerals underlying the surface should be determined at a later 
time. (Trial Tr., Vol. 2, pp. 11-12.) The court found that 
there was no indication of any prior use or ongoing extraction 
of minerals on the Roller property even up to the date of trial 
and that the claim was therefore very speculative in nature. 
(Trial Tr., Vol. 3 p. 4.) 
Contrary to the Rollers' assertion in their statement of 
facts and argument, the court also allowed them to introduce 
evidence on the highest and best use of the property as a dry 
land farm with wildlife resources of a deer herd as that use 
reflected on fair market value and severance damages. In 
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connection with the deer herd, the court held that the Rollers 
were entitled to put on evidence that a willing buyer would pay 
less for their remaining property after taking because of the 
damage done to the potential value of the hunting rights. 
(Trial Tr. , Vol. 1, p. 87.) The Rollers' appraiser, using an 
income approach in assessing the value of the wildlife 
potential, calculated a value of $52,742.00 as an incremental 
increase to fair market value of the property. (Trial Tr., 
Vol. 2, p. 66-70.) 
After trial, the court denied Rollers' claim for attorneys' 
fees and costs based upon an assertion that Cornish abandoned 
claims for a fee simple in the property. The trial court held 
that there was no abandonment because Cornish did not dismiss 
the cause of action as required by the statute to effectuate an 
abandonment and that although the proceedings were changed 
because of the statute to seek only a perpetual easement, this 
did not constitute abandonment. (Tr., Hearing 3-23-88, p. 
31-32.) 
The Rollers also sought an award of costs of $2,252.65 (R. 
833-34). The court awarded costs of $74.00 (R. 960). The 
court disallowed the remaining expenses for photocopies, 
exhibits, photographs and other items as not properly taxable 
costs. (R. 833, 960). Thereafter, the Rollers took this 
appeal. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the district court in all 
respects. The district court's rulings on issues of law were 
correct and its rulings on evidentiary issues did not 
constitute an abuse of discretion. 
The district court determined that there had been no 
showing of bad faith, fraud or an abuse of discretion and that 
public use and necessity had been established by Cornish to 
justify the condemnation of the property in question. There-
fore, the court appropriately did not submit the issues of 
public use and necessity to the jury for determination. 
The enactment of town ordinances, which were never 
enforced, did not reach the status of a regulatory taking. The 
Rollers were not deprived of economically viable uses of their 
property. Moreover, the date of taking for purposes of deter-
mining just compensation was appropriately held to be the date 
of service of summons rather than the enactment date of 
Ordinance 81-1. 
Immediately following the Rollers' assertion that valuable 
mineral rights underlaid the property to be taken in fee, 
Cornish amended its complaint to seek only a perpetual easement 
as it was required to do by statute. The Rollers' attempt to 
characterize this action as an "abandonment" must fail since 
the Utah statute contemplates a knowing, voluntary dismissal of 
the condemnation action which did not occur in this proceed-
ing. Moreover, the abandonment statute was designed to protect 
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a condemnee in circumstances where, having begun, the condemnor 
counts the risk too high and terminates the condemnation pro-
ceeding altogether. In this case, given the Rollers' delay in 
asserting the claim of valuable mineral rights, as a matter of 
policy the claim for attorneys' fees and costs should be 
rejected. 
The trial court properly excluded evidence of the value of 
mineral rights as untimely and speculative. The court had 
considerable discretion in admitting or excluding this evidence 
and its determinations should not be overturned unless an abuse 
of discretion is shown. Here, given the fact that there was no 
ongoing use or previous extraction of the minerals and no 
present plans to extract them, the court properly kept this 
issue from the jury and concluded that this issue appropriately 
should be resolved when, and if, the Rollers were to start 
extracting the minerals. 
The court allowed the Rollers to put on evidence of the 
value of a wildlife resource on the property, namely a herd of 
deer, as that impacted on fair market value and the highest and 
best use of the property. The jury considered the value of a 
wildlife resource as it reflected on highest and best use of 
the property. The court appropriately refused to allow the 
Rollers to put on evidence of future profits from the future 
sale of hunting access permits as an independent and separate 
element of compensation in addition to the fair market value 
calculation. 
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The court also denied Rollers' expenses of $2,252.65 as not 
being taxable costs. The expenses claimed by the Rollers were 
not required to be paid to the court or to witnesses and thus, 
did not fall into the category of taxable costs. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING 
AS A MATTER OF LAW THE ISSUE OF PUBLIC USE 
AND NECESSITY. 
A. The Standard of Review Proposed by the Appellants is 
Erroneous and is not the Appropriate Standard Here. 
Rollers propose that in considering these issues on appeal, 
the court apply a standard of review of viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to them. This is an erroneous 
standard. The case cited by Rollers in support of their 
proposed standard of review, National American Life Ins. Co. v. 
Bayou Country Club, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 417, 403 P.2d 26 (1965) 
does not deal with the standard of review to be applied in an 
eminent domain proceeding. It involved an action to collect a 
promissory note and is inapposite. 
The appropriate standard of review to be applied in connec-
tion with the evidentiary issues raised in this appeal is that 
the decisions of the trial court should be affirmed unless it 
is found that the trial court abused its discretion. See State 
Road Commission v, Larkin, 27 Utah 2d 295, 495 P.2d 817 
(1972). In particular, the trial court has considerable 
discretion in admitting or excluding evidence, and the court's 
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ruling on evidentiary issues should not be disturbed unless it 
appears that the court abused its discretion. _Id. at 820. 
The fundamental principle in condemnation actions is that 
what the parties are entitled to is a fair opportunity to 
present their respective cases to a court and jury for deter-
mination. When this has been accomplished, all presumptions 
favor the validity of the verdict and the judgment; and this 
includes all aspects of the conduct of the proceedings and 
rulings of the court. The burden is upon the appellant to show 
not only that there was error, but that it was substantial and 
prejudicial and that, as a result, they were in some manner 
deprived of a full and fair presentation and consideration of 
the disputed issues. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. 
Mitsui Investment, Inc., 522 P.2d 1370, 1374 (Utah 1974). 
Even if it should be determined that the trial court erred 
in its judicial rulings, this Court must consider whether the 
error was prejudicial. An error in anything done or omitted by 
the court shall be disregarded unless it affects the substan-
tial rights of the parties. Redevelopment Agency of Roy v. 
Jones, 743 P.2d 1233, 1235 (Utah App. 1987). Such an error is 
harmless unless it would have had a "substantial influence in 
bringing about a different verdict." Redevelopment Agency of 
Salt Lake City v. Tanner, 740 P.2d 1296, 1303-04 (Utah 1987). 
In reviewing such an error, the evidence is viewed in the light 
most favorable to the jury verdict. Hill v. Hartog, 658 P.2d 
1206, 1208 (Utah 1983). 
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It is clear, as set forth below, that the trial court did 
not abuse its considerable latitude or discretion and therefore 
its rulings should not be disturbed on appeal. 
B. The Trial Court Appropriately Determined as a Matter of Law 
that Cornish Town had Made a Showing of Public Use and 
Necessity. 
The court's review authority as to the "necessity" of the 
taking, is governed by the following statute: 
Before property can be taken it must appear: 
(1) That the use to which it is to be applied is 
a use authorized by law; 
(2) That the taking is necessary to such use; 
(3) That construction and use of all property 
sought to be condemned will commence within a reason-
able time as determined by the court, after the 
initiation of proceedings under this chapter; and 
(4) If already appropriated to some public use, 
that the public use to which it is to be applied is a 
more necessary public use. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-4 (1987). Clearly, it is for the court 
to determine, as a matter of law, that the conditions precedent 
in Section 78-34-4 are present. 
1. The Public Use Here Was Authorized by Statute. 
The public use for which Cornish condemned the Rollers' 
property was a use authorized by statute. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-34-1(3) (1987). Section 10-7-4 of the Utah Code relating 
to cities and towns states that a town may acquire all or any 
part of a water works system or property connected therewith 
and may bring a condemnation action to acquire the 
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same. Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-4 (1986). Section 10-8-14 
provides that a town may construct, maintain and operate a 
water works system. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-4 (1986). Section 
10-8-15 provides that a town may exercise extra-territorial 
jurisdiction for the purpose of maintaining and protecting from 
injury and pollution its water works system. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-8-15 (1986). Section 10-8-18 provides that a town may 
purchase springs and, if necessary to secure sources of water 
supply, may purchase or lease land. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-18 
(1986) . 
The court here determined as a threshold issue that Cornish 
Town had the right to take the Rollers' property for a public 
use. The presumption exists that a use is public if the 
legislature has declared it to be such. The legislature's 
decision must be treated with the consideration due to a 
co-ordinate department of the government of the state. Where a 
public use is expressly authorized by statute, the court can 
easily make, as it did here, a determination that there exists 
statutory authorization for the taking. 
2. The Taking by Cornish Also Met the "Necessity" 
Requirement. 
Under Utah law, the question of public necessity is 
basically a political question that is generally not disturbed 
by the court in the absence of fraud, bad faith, or abuse of 
discretion. "[N]ecessity, expediency or propriety in 
[condemning property for a public use] is a political question 
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and in absence of fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion, 
[such action] will not be disturbed by the courts." Bountiful 
v. Swift, 535 P.2d 1236, 1238 (Utah 1975); see also Oqden v. 
Stephens, 21 Utah 2d 336, 339, 445 P.2d 703, 705 (1968). 
The statement from Salt Lake County v. Ramoselli, 567 P.2d 
182 (Utah 1977), cited by Rollers on page 20 of their brief, 
appears at first glance to be at odds with Swift and Stephens, 
supra. However, the Ramoselli case involved the acquisition of 
park land in a situation where there were no immediate plans 
for development. The court focused on the fact that there 
wasn't even a projected need in the foreseeable future for the 
park. In other words, Salt Lake County did not even have a 
general idea of what they were going to do with that ground. 
They were simply trying to acquire ground to protect their 
future needs down the road. That case also focused on the 
absence of any funds, budgeted or appropriated, for the 
acquisition of the property. _Id. at 184. 
Ramoselli can best be viewed not really as a challenge to 
the authority to condemn, but as an abuse of discretion case. 
That is, in the absence of some reasonable belief that it was 
necessary to acquire the land, it was an abuse of discretion to 
do so since there was no evidence that Salt Lake County had any 
reasonably foreseeable use for that property or plans to use 
it. The facts in that case stand squarely in opposition to the 
facts here. This is not a case where there are no plans for 
development in the reasonably foreseeable future. Instead, the 
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Town intended to make immediate improvements to the town water 
supply system. 
In two cases decided subsequent to Ramoselli, however, the 
Court reaffirmed the traditional limited role of the judiciary 
in reviewing a determination of necessity by the condemnor. In 
Williams v. Hyrum Gibbons & Sons Co., 602 P.2d 684 (Utah 1979), 
the trial court found that the taking of the particular site by 
the condemnor was not necessary since there were other satis-
factory alternative sites available. On appeal this Court 
reversed, holding that the defendants presented no proof and 
the trial court made no finding that the plaintiff's exercise 
in selecting this particular property was a product of bad 
faith, fraud, caprice, or arbitrariness. Jd- at 688. The 
plaintiff had met its initial burden of showing that the taking 
was reasonably requisite to effect the authorized public 
purpose for which it was sought. Once that burden was met, 
particular questions as to the location or amount of property 
to be taken were left to the sound discretion of the condemning 
authority absent a showing by clear and convincing evidence 
that such determinations are the product of fraud, caprice, or 
arbitrariness. Ld. at 688, quoting Fairbanks v. Metro Co., 540 
P.2d 1056, 1058 (Alaska 1975). 
In Utah Dept. of Transportation v. Fuller, 603 P.2d 814 
(Utah 1979), relied upon by the trial court here, the Court 
also reaffirmed the traditional rule. In Fuller, defendants 
urged that the proposed location of a sewage lagoon was 
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arbitrarily determined and that its construction would 
constitute a waste of public funds. The court rejected the 
defendant's contentions. With regard to the selection of the 
particular site, the court stated: 
It may be said to be a general rule that, unless a 
corporation exercising the power of eminent domain 
acts in bad faith or is guilty of oppression, its 
discretion in the selection of land will not be 
interfered with. With the degree of necessity or the 
extent which the property will advance the public 
purpose, the court have nothing to do: when the use is 
public, the necessity or expediency of appropriating 
any particular property is not a subject of judicial 
cognizance. 
Id. at 817, quoting Postal Tel. Cable Co. of Utah v. Oregon 
S.L.R. Co., 23 Utah 474, 484-485, 65 P. 735, 739 (1901). The 
court also quoted Nichols with respect to the limitation on the 
scope of judicial review: 
[T]he legislature may, and usually does, delegate the 
power of selecting the land to be condemned to the 
public agent that is to do the work; in such case it 
makes little, if any, difference whether the grant of 
authority is, in terms, limited to such land as is 
"necessary" for the purpose in view, for a general 
grant of authority carries the same limitation by 
implication and in either case the necessity is for 
the condemnor and not for the court to decide, and the 
decision of such condemnor is final as long as it acts 
reasonably and in good faith. (Emphasis added by the 
Court). 
Utah Department of Transportation v. Fuller, supra, 603 P.2d at 
817; 1 Nichols an Eminent Domain, § 4.11[3] at 4-184, 4-185. 
The general rule in Utah thus remains unchanged that unless 
there is bad faith, fraud, or abuse of discretion, the deter-
mination of the condemning authority will not be disturbed. 
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The burden is on the appellant to plead and prove such 
conditions by clear and convincing evidence. Williams v. Hyrum 
Gibbons & Sons, supra, 602 P.2d at 688. Appellants did not 
plead fraud or bad faith and thus are barred from raising these 
issues at this stage in the proceedings. In fact, appellants' 
counsel specifically waived any allegation of fraud on the part 
of Cornish in pursuing the condemnation during the hearing on 
immediate occupancy. (Transcript, Hearing pp. 37-38). In the 
absence of any allegations or evidence of fraud, bad faith or 
abuse of discretion, the trial court correctly ruled that it 
would not disturb Cornish's determination that the condemnation 
was necessary. 
The Court, in any event, heard three days of testimony on 
the issue of necessity and found that Cornish did not act 
unreasonably, in bad faith or arbitrarily. Considerable 
evidence was presented by both sides at the hearing on the 
order of immediate occupancy as to the question of public use 
and necessity. The evidence was conflicting in nature, but the 
trial judge found believable testimony, as he was empowered to 
do, in favor of the plaintiff. When a trial judge, in 
resolving conflicting questions of fact, makes findings 
supported by substantial evidence, the appellate court should 
not interfere with that decision. Bountiful v. Swift, supra, 
535 P.2d at 1238. 
The only possible ground upon which the determination of 
necessity could be overturned would be if there had been an 
-18-
abuse of discretion by Cornish. The evidence is clear, 
however, that there was no abuse of discretion. Although there 
were disagreements at the hearing on the order of immediate 
occupancy about the impact of a protection zone on nitrate 
levels in the spring water, this disagreement among experts did 
not indicate an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion 
would require the absence of any rational basis to support the 
decision of the Cornish Town Council to pursue condemnation. 
It is clear that Cornish's actions were based upon the 
recommendations of its experts that the probable source of 
nitrate contamination of the springs was the use of fertilizers 
in the protection area. The experts recommended to the town 
council that they acquire the protection zones to alleviate 
this problem (Transcript, Hearing p. 429). Experts determined 
that the probable source of the nitrates was related to the 
agriculture being performed around and above the springs. 
(Transcript, Hearing p. 211). It was opined that farming 
practices were most likely the source of the nitrates in the 
soil. (Transcript, Hearing p. 213-214). Other probable 
explanations, including nitrate sources naturally in the 
bedrock, were ruled out. (Transcript, Hearing p. 222-223). 
State officials indicated that, based upon the studies 
conducted and the best scientific evidence available, a 
protection zone would be beneficial. (Transcript, Hearing 
p. 126). 
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It is clear from the evidence that the Town had a rational 
basis to conclude that condemnation of a protection zone around 
the water system would allow for the protection of the town's 
water system and would possibly reduce nitrate levels. More-
over, the condemnation of rights-of-way would allow access to 
repair and maintain the springs. The town's action then had a 
rational basis. 
Even in the absence of a determination that the protection 
zones around the springs might specifically alleviate the 
nitrate problem because farming practices were being conducted 
within that protection zone using nitrate fertilizers, the Town 
would still have been entitled to acquire such protection zones 
for the prevention of future contamination of its water source. 
Therefore, the court did find that the town met its burden 
of showing the right to condemn because the taking of the pro-
perty was necessary for a public use. The court examined the 
evidence and correctly found that Cornish had met its burden of 
showing public use and necessity. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO ALLOW 
DEFENDANTS TO SUBMIT THE ISSUE OF PUBLIC USE 
AND NECESSITY TO THE JURY. 
The appellants argue that the trial court erred in failing 
to submit the issue of public use and necessity to the jury. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 25.) This is erroneous. The deter-
minations of public use and necessity are clearly questions of 
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law to be determined by the court. See Bountiful v. Swift, 
supra, 535 P.2d at 1238 (the trial judge is given the power to 
hear and decide if the conditions precedent to the taking are 
met); Perry v. Thomas, 82 Utah 159, 22 P.2d 343, 346 (1933) 
(whether property is being taken for public use is a judicial 
question for the court). 
Appellant's argument that the jury should have heard 
evidence of public use and necessity is also erroneous because 
this issue was resolved at the hearing on the motion for order 
of immediate occupancy. The court did not err in refusing to 
allow the appellants to submit the same evidence on these 
issues to the jury. This Court has stated: 
Whenever issues pertaining to authority or 
jurisdiction to condemn exist at the time an order of 
immediate occupancy is sought, the best interests of 
all concerned, including the court, dictate that those 
issues be resolved prior to issuance of the order. 
Otherwise, the condemnor runs the risk of defeat and 
the resultant loss of funds expended in preparing the 
property for its new use. Similarly, the condemnee 
runs the risk of irreparable harm to the property if 
the condemnor is permitted to occupy and alter the 
property to accommodate the new use. 
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Tanner, supra, 740 
P.2d at 1300. 
The hearing on the order of immediate occupancy was a full 
blown evidentiary hearing. It involved more than a showing of 
a prima facie case. Evidence supporting and attempting to 
refute the public use and necessity was fully considered. 
Accordingly, the trial court appropriately determined the 
issues of public use and necessity at the time of the hearing 
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on the order of immediate occupancy and did not err in keeping 
this issue from a jury. Furthermore, plaintiffs did not raise 
any new evidentiary issues but simply sought to have those same 
matters considered by the jury. 
POINT THREE 
THE ENACTMENT OF A TOWN ORDINANCE DID NOT 
CONSTITUTE THE TAKING OF ROLLERS' PROPERTY 
NOR SHOULD THE ENACTMENT DATE OF THE 
ORDINANCE BE THE VALUATION DATE OF THE 
PROPERTY ACTUALLY TAREN BY EMINENT DOMAIN. 
A. The Passage of Ordinance 81-1 did not Constitute a 
Compensable "Taking" of Rollers' Property. 
The Rollers claim that passage of Ordinance 81-1 by Cornish 
Town resulted in the denial of all beneficial and economically 
viable use of 85 percent of their total property and decreased 
the value of their property by 85-90 percent. Their argument, 
in essence, is that the mere enactment of the ordinance, in and 
of itself, constituted a taking of approximately 85 percent of 
their property rather than the relatively small amount of 
property eventually condemned by Cornish. 
Athough this claim was never framed by the Rollers' plead-
ings, the Rollers brought a motion for partial summary judgment 
on this issue. The trial court found that the ordinance did 
not reach the status of a regulatory taking and that the ordi-
nance did not prohibit the Rollers use of the property but was 
only an attempt to stop the use of such chemicals that pollute 
the water supply. (R. 556). 
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Plaintiffs cite First English Evangelical Lutheran Church 
v. County of Los Angeles, U.S. , 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987) 
and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission/ U.S. , 107 
S. Ct. 3141 (1987) as establishing a compensable taking. 
Neither case is applicable and both are clearly distinguishable. 
First English involves a "temporary regulatory taking" in 
which a subsequently invalidated county ordinance deprived a 
property owner of all uses of his land. The court stated: 
We merely hold that where the government's activities 
have already worked a taking of all use of property no 
subsequent action by the government can relieve it of 
the duty to provide compensation for the period during 
which the taking was effective. 
We also point out that the allegation of the complaint 
which we treat as true for purpose of our decision was 
that the ordinance in question denied appellant all 
use of its property. 
First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389 (emphasis added). 
In First English, the Supreme Court clarified its prior 
holdings in the area of regulatory takings by establishing that 
under some circumstances a "temporary" regulatory taking may 
exist where a land owner has been denied "all uses" of his 
property. However, the court in that case, in the context of a 
motion to dismiss, specifically did not decide whether the 
ordinance in question actually denied the property owner all 
uses of the property and retained the threshold requirement 
that a property owner must be denied all uses in order to 
constitute a compensable taking under the federal 
constitutional guarantees. 107 S. Ct. at 2384, 2388. 
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Appellant's reliance on Nollan, supra, is also misplaced. 
Nollan involved the conditioning of permission to rebuild a 
home on the transfer to the public of a right-of-way easement. 
The Nollan court "recognized that land use regulation does not 
effect a taking if it 'substantially advances legitimate state 
interest' and does not 'deny an owner economically viable use 
of its land.'" Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3146. 
The No11an court focused on the first of the two require-
ments and found a taking because the exaction of an easement 
under the circumstances of the case, did not substantially 
advance legitimate state interests. IdL at 3148. Deeding over 
a right-of-way easement utterly failed to advance the purpose 
of the California law in question. _Id. The easement was 
unrelated to the public's view of the beaches. The Nollan 
court noted, however, that if the Coastal Commission had 
attached to the building permit some condition related to the 
public's ability to see the beach, no taking would have 
occurred. _Id. at 3147-48. The court provided the example of 
placing height and width restrictions on the beach front home. 
Id. Thus, Nollan is distinguishable on its facts and by appli-
cation of the substantial state interest test which is not at 
issue here. 
The Supreme Court in Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc, v. De 
Benedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987) reaffirmed the 
high threshold requirement for a compensable taking to exist, 
even to the extent of validating a state statutory scheme that 
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required leaving fifty percent of recoverable coal deposits in 
place in order to support structures. 
Every zoning scheme adopted by a local governmental 
authority has some impact on surrounding property values. 
Assuming arguendo some validity to the Rollers' claim that 
passage of Ordinance 81-1 resulted in diminution in the value 
of their property, the claim of diminution fails to meet the 
burden of demonstrating a compensable taking since the Rollers 
did not show that they were deprived of all uses of their 
property. 
It is a well established rule that governmental regulation 
of the use of private property cannot be deemed to amount to a 
taking in the constitutional sense, for which the land owner 
would be entitled to receive compensation, unless the regula-
tion deprives the owners of any and all economically viable use 
of the property. As the Tenth Circuit noted in C. F. Lytle Co. 
v. Clark, 491 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1974): 
The due process and just compensation clauses of the 
state and federal constitutions do not require that 
zoning ordinances permit a landowner to make the most 
profitable use of his property. For there to be a 
taking the landowner must show that he has been 
deprived all reasonable uses of his land. 
Id. at 838. (Emphasis added.) Accord, Rent Island Joint 
Venture v. Smith, 452 F. Supp. 455, 460-61 (D. Md. 1978). 
The Rollers' claim of diminution in value relies on the 
fiction that, but for the regulation in question, it would have 
been sold to a willing buyer by a willing purchaser. The 
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evidence is clear that the Rollers were not offering and in 
fact would not under any circumstances sell their property. 
Furthermore, even if the Rollers could present evidence that 
their property had diminished in value because of Cornish's 
enactment of Ordinance 81-1, a long line of Supreme Court cases 
recognizes that the right to use ones property is always 
subject to the reasonable exercise of the police power, and 
that virtually all zoning decisions have some economic impact 
on property values. Mere diminution in property value is 
insufficient to meet the burden of demonstrating a taking by 
regulation. See, e.g. Penn Central Trans. Co. v. City of New 
York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-131 (1978) (unspecified loss in value); 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (seventy-five 
percent loss of value); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 
(1915) (eighty-seven and a half percent loss of value). 
Moreover, Rollers' taking claim must fail because it did 
not result in the loss of all economically viable use. The 
Rollers did not lose all economically viable use of the land. 
The Rollers continued to farm the land in question after the 
enactment of Ordinance 81-1 and the record does not indicate a 
loss of all economically viable use. In fact, the yield 
records and fertilization history submitted by Rollers did not 
reflect any significant change in farming practice after 1981. 
(See Defendants' Exhibit 30, Hearing on Order of Immediate 
Occupancy.) 
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Roller admitted that he has fertilized in the Pearson 
protection area since enactment of the ordinance. (Trial Tr. 
Vol. Ill, p. 149). For example, in 1984 he used 50 pounds of 
nitrogen per acre. (Trial Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 150). The evidence 
does not indicate any decreased production yields of the 
Rollers' farm land after the enactment of Ordinance 81-1. (See 
Defendants' Exhibit 30). In fact, the Rollers' appraiser 
testified that they had one of the highest agricultural yields 
in Utah. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p. 49). Moreover, the evidence 
indicates that Cornish suspended the enforcement of the 
ordinance because there was no way to enforce it. (Transcript, 
Hearing p. 30). Thus, the court did not err in holding that 
enactment of the ordinance did not constitute a taking. 
Finally, the Rollers' claim of a taking should be denied 
since there is a possibility of future use of the property. In 
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 106 
S. Ct. 2561 (1986), the United Supreme Court reiterated a 
finality requirement on taking claims. Summary judgment, the 
court held, must be granted if there is a possibility that 
"some development will be permitted." Jd. at 2568. In 
MacDonald the plaintiff had submitted a proposal to subdivide 
its property into single and multi-family residential lots. 
The County Planning Commission rejected the proposal and the 
County Board of Supervisors affirmed. Plaintiff subsequently 
filed a taking claim. Finding that some other development of 
the land was still possible, the court affirmed denial of the 
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taking claim as premature. Id. at 2565, 2568-2569. Even if 
the Rollers had fully complied with Ordinance 81-1, which they 
did not, the evidence does not support their claim that the 
land lost all economic viability. The land is still 
agriculturally viable and compliance with the ordinance could 
have resulted in continued operations. See also Williamson Co. 
Regional Planning v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985). 
B. The Valuation Date of the Property Taken by Eminent Domain 
was Appropriately Determined to be the Date of Service of 
Summons. 
The appellants seek to have this Court rule that the date 
of taking and thus the date of valuation of their property 
should be when Cornish passed Ordinance 81-1. The trial court 
found that the taking was deemed to be the date the summons was 
served as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-11 rather than the 
date of enactment of Ordinance 81-1. (R. 580) Furthermore, 
the court specifically found that none of the special 
circumstances and factors discussed in Utah State Road 
Commission v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984), upon which the 
Rollers relied, was present in this case to justify a valuation 
date other than the date of service of summons. (R. 581). 
That factual determination should not be disturbed unless 
clearly erroneous. 
Friberg involved an unusual and unigue fact situation where 
the condemnee was served with process seven years before the 
case proceeded to a final decree. The court's ruling was based 
upon the lengthy delays in the proceedings and the fact that 
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the value of the property increased substantially during the 
prolonged proceeding so that valuation at the time of service 
would be fundamentally unfair. 
The trial court in the instant case correctly determined 
that none of those special facts and circumstances were 
present. The Rollers' property did not significantly 
appreciate in value. Most significantly, as set forth above, 
the enactment of Ordinance 81-1 did not constitute a 
compensable "taking" of the property. Thus, the Rollers did 
not meet their burden of rebutting the applicable presumption 
that the date for determining valuation was the date of service 
of process. 
POINT FOUR 
CORNISH TOWN DID NOT ABANDON ANY OF ITS 
CLAIMS AND, THEREFORE, THE ROLLERS MAY NOT 
RECOVER ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS IN 
CONNECTION THEREWITH. 
The Rollers assert that Cornish abandoned at the time of 
trial claims involving mineral rights and for taking in fee 
simple. Defendants' characterization of the amendment of 
plaintiff's complaint to seek only a perpetual easement rather 
than fee simple as an "abandonment" is erroneous and contrary 
to the statutory framework applicable to eminent domain 
proceedings in Utah. 
Cornish's amendment of its pleadings was triggered by an 
offer of proof on the first day of trial that the property to 
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be condemned in fee was underlaid with valuable minerals. The 
Rollers never put Cornish on notice, by pleadings or otherwise, 
of a claim of valuable mineral rights until the morning of the 
first day of trial. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p. 4) 
Cornish's amendment therefore was analogous to an amendment 
to conform to the evidence and not to some voluntary abandon-
ment on the part of Cornish with full knowledge of all the 
factors involved. Cornish had no right or need to the subsur-
face mineral rights. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p. 4). Rollers' 
proffer that the surface ground was underlaid with valuable 
minerals sufficiently valuable to justify extraction triggered 
the provision of the statute that the condemning authority 
could, under such circumstances, acquire only a perpetual 
easement. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p. 15). 
The relevant statute provides that a fee simple may be 
taken except in cases where valuable mineral deposits exist 
under the surface ground. In such cases: "where surface 
ground is underlaid with minerals, coal or other deposits 
sufficiently valuable to justify extraction, only a perpetual 
easement may be taken over the surface ground over such 
deposits." Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-2(1) (1987) (emphasis added). 
When suddenly faced with a claim that valuable mineral 
rights existed, plaintiff was required by statute to amend its 
complaint. The statute mandated that only a perpetual easement 
could be taken. Cornish did what it was required to do. 
(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p. 7.) To attempt to construe plaintiff's 
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compliance with the statute as an abandonment is erroneous. 
The abandonment statute contemplates a voluntary dismissal of 
the entire condemnation action and does not apply in a 
situation where the condemnor has no authority to take in fee 
the property in question. See Martineau v. State Conservation 
Commission, 54 Wis. 76, 194 N.W.2d 664, 669 (1972). 
A. The Statutory Language Mandates that the Rollers' Claim for 
Attorneys' Fees and Costs Should Be Rejected. 
1. The Statute Contemplates a Complete Abandonment of the 
Proceedings Which Did Not Occur in this Case. 
There is no right to recover attorneys' fees in a 
condemnation proceeding except as authorized by statute. 
Statutes allowing the taxation of costs and attorneys' fees in 
eminent domain proceedings against the state are in derogation 
of the common law and should be strictly construed. Martineau 
v. State Conservation Commission, supra, 194 N.W.2d at 666. 
The Utah statute provides for the recovery of attorneys' fees 
in only very limited instances: 
Condemnor, whether a public or private body, may, at 
any time prior to final payment of compensation and 
damages awarded the defendant by the court or jury, 
abandon the proceedings and cause the action to be 
dismissed without prejudice, provided, however, that 
as a condition of dismissal condemnor first compensate 
condemnee for all damages he has sustained and also 
reimburse him in full for all reasonable and necessary 
expenses actually incurred by condemnee because of the 
filing of the action by condemnor, including 
attorneys' fees. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-16 (1987) (emphasis added). 
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The term "abandon" contemplates or implies intentional, 
voluntary action. Detroit International Bridge Co. v. American 
Seed Co., 249 Mich. 289, 228 N.W. 791, 795 (1930). Abandonment 
consists of the intentional, voluntary relinquishment of a 
known right. Los Angeles v Abbott, 129 Cal. App. 144, 18 P.2d 
785 (1933). Here, the only rights of Cornish Town in connec-
tion with the condemnation of the Rollers1 property were those 
granted by statute. Since the statute mandates the acquisition 
of only a perpetual easement rather than fee simple where 
surface ground is underlaid with valuable minerals, there was 
no relinquishment of a "known right." As previously set forth, 
where the condemnor was forced to amend the complaint to comply 
with a statutory grant of authority to take, there is no 
abandonment. Furthermore, Cornish never knew of or sought the 
mineral rights claimed and thus, it was not abandoning any 
previously intentionally-sought rights or "known rights." 
Moreover, the statute is written in the conjunctive: in 
order to award the defendant attorneys' fees, the condemnor 
must abandon the proceedings and the action must be dismissed. 
The statute contemplates a complete surrender of the entire 
proceedings and the attempt to condemn. It requires the 
condemnor to abandon "the proceedings," i.e. to give up on its 
efforts to acquire by eminent domain all of the property in 
question. The actions of Cornish Town cannot possibly be 
construed as an abandonment of the proceedings. 
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The only Utah case interpreting the Utah statute is Provo 
City v. Cropper, 28 Utah 2d 1, 497 P.2d 629 (1972). That case 
involved the complete abandonment of an eminent domain 
proceeding and dismissal of the action because the valuation 
placed on the property was too high for the city to pay. The 
legislature in passing this statute deemed it appropriate to 
impose the condemnee's costs on the condemnor where the 
condemnor initiated and then failed to carry through with 
condemnation proceedings. The court in Cropper stated that 
"the statute was designed to correct a problem of unfairness in 
casting a burden upon the owners of private property in this 
type of proceeding when the condemnor elects not to go ahead 
with the acquisition." ^d. at 630. 
The problem that the statute was designed to deal with is 
not present here. In the instant case, Cornish went ahead with 
its acquisition and did not dismiss the proceedings or other-
wise fail to carry the proceedings through to a conclusion. 
The trial court correctly held that there was no abandonment 
because Cornish did not dismiss the cause of action and that 
although the proceedings were changed because of the statute to 
seek only a perpetual easement, this did not constitute abandon-
ment. (Hearing Tr. 3-23-88, pp. 31-32.) 
Eminent domain is a creature of statute. The Utah statute 
does not provide for the payment of costs and attorneys' fees 
in this case where an amendment to the complaint was made to 
conform to the statute. Although Cornish disputes the 
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characterization of its amendment to the complaint as a partial 
abandonment, even if it could be so considered, the Utah 
statute only provides for payment of costs and fees in 
circumstances constituting a total abandonment and dismissal of 
the action prior to a conclusion. 
2. The Cases Cited by the Rollers Involve a Different 
Statutory Framework and Thus are Not Applicable. 
The Rollers cite, inter alia, two California cases in 
support of their argument that when a portion of the original 
claim has been eliminated or omitted by an amendment to the 
complaint, this constitutes an abandonment justifying the award 
of costs and attorneys' fees. See Merced Irrigation District 
v. Woolstenhulme, 93 Cal. Rptr. 833, 483 P.2d 1 (1971); County 
of Kern v. Galatas, 200 Cal. App. 2d 353, 19 Cal. Rptr. 348 
(Cal. App. 1962). These cases were based on Section 1255a of 
the California Code of Civil Procedure, a now repealed statute, 
which was substantially different than Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-34-16 (1987). 
The California statute imposed costs on the plaintiff in 
the case of even an implied or partial abandonment. It also 
had no provision that required that the condemnor dismiss the 
entire action, which is expressly set forth in the Utah 
statute. The current California statute is based primarily on 
former Section 1255a and specifically provides for the payment 
of costs and attorneys' fees in the case of a partial 
abandonment by an amendment to the complaint to significantly 
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reduce the property or property interest being taken. There is 
no similar statutory provision in Utah. See §§ 1268.510 & 
1268.610 California Code of Civil Procedure. The statutes of 
the states in the other cases cited by the plaintiff are also 
likely substantively different than the Utah statute. See, 
e.g., Independent School District v. Gross, 291 Minn. 158, 190 
N.W.2d 651, 658 (1971) (partial recitation of statute sub-
stantially different from the Utah statute). 
The statutory framework in Utah is different from those 
jurisdictions from which the Rollers attempt to muster authority 
for their argument. Unlike some other states, in Utah no award 
of attorneys' fees and costs in the case of a partial abandon-
ment is allowed. Thus, the cases cited by defendants are 
inapposite and do not provide meaningful assistance to the 
court in resolving this issue. On the other hand, the plain 
and unambiguous language of the Utah statute, which this Court 
must apply, only imposes the condemnee's costs on the condemnor 
in the case of a total abandonment and subsequent dismissal of 
the action. 
B. As a Matter of Policy, the Rollers' Demand for Attorneys' 
Fees and Costs Should Be Rejected. 
The Rollers failed to make any claims of valuable mineral 
rights underlying the property to be condemned until the 
morning of the first day of trial. Although the Rollers 
provided the names of their witnesses approximately a week 
before trial, counsel for the defendants refused in the face of 
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a direct request, to divulge the subject matter of the wit-
nesses' testimony in any way which would have enabled Cornish 
to be placed on notice that a claim was being asserted of 
valuable mineral rights underlying the property so as to 
trigger the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-2(1) (1987) 
(R. 899). 
The parties also agreed to and did exchange appraisals 
prior to trial. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p. 5). The Rollers' 
appraisal did not indicate that defendants made any claim of 
valuable mineral rights nor did it even refer to the existence 
of minerals underlying the surface. There was thus no 
valuation of any mineral rights included in the appraisal of 
fair market value. (Trial Tr., Vol III, p. 8-9). The value of 
Rollers' mineral right claims should have been part of the 
subject matter of the appraisal. The first Cornish heard of 
the claim of $38 million in extractable mineral deposits on the 
property was the morning of the first day of trial. 
Furthermore, the assertion of a claim of valuable mineral 
rights upon the property is properly a claim which should have 
been raised by counterclaim or affirmative pleading. Cornish 
should have been placed on notice that the Rollers claimed that 
the condemnation would take valuable mineral rights. The 
Rollers never gave any notice of this claim, although they had 
numerous opportunities to do so in the hearing on the order of 
immediate occupancy October 8-10, 1986 and an evidentiary 
hearing on various other matters held on December 21, 1987. It 
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was incumbent on the defendants to raise the claim of valuable 
mineral rights by pleading and at the hearing on the order of 
immediate occupancy. Instead, the Rollers engaged in trial by 
ambush and kept this claim hidden from Cornish until trial 
began. 
This Court should not countenance the Rollers' demand for 
attorneys' fees and costs based on their assertion of 
abandonment. From a practical standpoint, had the Rollers 
notified Cornish of this claim previously, they could have 
saved the attorneys' fees and costs they now seek to recover. 
Defendants' disingenuous attempt to hide a $38 million demand 
until the morning of trial and then force plaintiff to make a 
so-called "abandonment" of the mineral claim because of the 
enormity of the potential claim should not be rewarded. 
POINT FIVE 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED EVIDENCE 
OF MINERAL RIGHTS. 
The court properly excluded evidence of the value of the 
minerals underlying the property. In State v. Runimoto, 62 
Hawaii 502, 617 P.2d 93 (1980), a case cited by Rollers, the 
court recognized the principle that the trial judge has broad 
discretionary authority to admit or exclude evidence and that 
its exercise of discretion will not be upset unless there is a 
clear abuse of discretion. Ld. at 97. With respect to a 
possible future use of the property, appellate courts have not 
been disposed to disturb the trial court's rejection of such 
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evidence even where its implementation was only a possibility. 
Honolulu v. International Air Service Co., 63 Hawaii 322, 628 
P.2d 192, 201 (1981). Cf. County of Hawaii v. Sotomura, 55 
Hawaii 677, 517 P.2d 57, 64 (1973), cert, denied on another 
issue, 419 U.S. 872 (1974) (evidence of an owner's plans for 
the development of his property, even if such development is 
possible, is inadmissible if it is not shown that there is a 
reasonable probability that it can be undertaken). 
The United States Supreme Court has stated in Olson v. 
United States, 292 U.S. 246 (1934): 
Elements affecting value that depend upon events or 
combinations of occurrences which, while within the 
realm of possibility, are not fairly shown to be 
reasonably probable, should be excluded from 
consideration, for that would be to allow mere 
speculation and conjecture to become a guide for the 
ascertainment of value - a thing to be condemned in 
business transactions as well as in judicial 
ascertainment of truth. 
Id. at 257. 
The trial court's rulings on admissibility of evidence 
should not be disturbed on appeal unless it appears that the 
court was clearly in error. Utah Dept. of Transportation v. 
Jones, 694 P.2d 1031, 1037 (Utah 1984). In State v. Jacobs, 16 
Utah 2d 167, 397 P.2d 463 (1964), the trial court excluded 
evidence relating to the proposed development of the property. 
This Court held that the trial court did not err in excluding 
the evidence. The Court held: 
The owner of property under condemnation is entitled 
to a value based upon the highest and best use to 
which it could be put at the time of the taking, 
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without limitation as to the use then actually made of 
it. However, the projected use, affecting value, must 
be not only possible, but reasonably probable. It 
must not be merely in the realm of speculation because 
the land is adaptable to a particular use in the remote 
and uncertain future. In any event, the admission of 
such evidence is within the sound discretion of the 
trial court, which was not abused in this case. 
Id. at 464. 
The court properly considered the Rollers' proffer on the 
mineral rights issue to be remote and speculative. A jury in 
an eminent domain proceedings "is insulated from the realities 
of the marketplace and hence is not equipped to give proper 
weight to indicia of highly remote values." Honolulu v. 
International Air Service Company, Ltd., supra, 628 P.2d at 
197. Thus, courts generally exclude evidence of values which 
is so "speculative" as to be unduly confusing to the jury. 
Id. The trial court's vantage point normally affords a clearer 
view of the "thin line that often separates competent opinion 
and relevant values from mere speculation and 'indicia of 
highly remote values,'" than the more distant position of the 
appellate court, ^d. Hence, appellate courts are disinclined 
to disturb the trial judge's assessment that the proffered 
evidence reflects, or does not reflect, speculation or remote 
values, unless a clear abuse of discretion vested in the court 
is apparent. Ld. at 197-198. 
There is no evidence in the record, or even Rollers' 
proffer, to suggest such valuable mineral rights were known or 
reasonably foreseeable as of the date of the taking used to 
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determine value. The question of whether the Rollers could 
extract the minerals was determined to be a question to be 
raised when, if ever, the minerals were actually to be 
extracted. In United States v. 3,218.9 Acres of Land, 619 F.2d 
288 (3rd Cir.) cert, denied, 449 U.S. 872 (1980), the 
appellants owned underlying mineral interests and land which 
was acquired by the government for a natural forest. The 
declaration of taking stated that the government took the 
estate in fee simple subject to, among other things, the 
reservation of mineral interests to the owners to enter and 
remove the minerals "in accordance with the rules and 
regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture." _Id. at 290. The 
mineral owners argued that the possibility that the secretary's 
rules could inhibit the removal of the minerals in the future 
presented a present basis for damages. The court held that the 
effect of these rules, if any, did not amount to a taking, and 
that the claim was premature. See also United States v. 
1,606.00 Acres of Land, 698 F.2d 402 (10th Cir. 1983) (a 
possible future taking of property cannot give rise to a 
present action for damages). 
Cornish also took the position that the existing water 
rights held by the town may prohibit the extraction of the 
minerals claimed by the Rollers in the area of the protection 
zones in any event. Counsel for Rollers admitted that that was 
an issue to be determined later on. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, 
p. 8). The court found that the issue of whether the Rollers 
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had a right to extract the mineral rights underlying the 
surface should also be determined at a later time. The court 
stated "if the time ever came that you wanted to exercise your 
right to extract minerals, which you would have the right to do 
because Cornish hasn't taken them, that you exercise those 
rights, and if there comes some question if its interference 
with the dominant estate, then you may have to litigate that." 
(Trial Tr. , Vol. II, pp. 11-12). 
The case of Wm. E. Russell Coal Company v. Board of County 
Commissioners of Boulder County, 129 Colo. 330, 270 P.2d 772 
(1954) cited by the defendants in their brief, is easily 
distinguishable from the situation here. In Russell, the coal 
company had for many years conducted coal mining operations 
under the surface. In addition, unlike the case here, the 
issue that the condemnation of the surface of the land 
constituted a taking of the respondents interest in the coal 
underlying the land was framed by the pleadings. The critical 
distinction, however, is that Russell involved an ongoing 
operation of mineral extraction unlike the speculative and 
remote possibility raised here. 
The court here found that there was no indication of any 
prior use or ongoing extraction of minerals on the Roller 
property and that for the defendant on the morning of the first 
day of trial to claim valuable minerals underlying the farm in 
the amount of $38 million dollars was not only untimely but 
very speculative in nature. (Trial tr. Vol. Ill, page 4). The 
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court concluded that the proffered evidence was speculative 
based upon the Rollers' belief that there may be minerals under 
the property and that the minerals may be valuable, where there 
has never been any extraction operation at the time of taking 
and that it was highly speculative whether the extraction of 
the minerals could be carried out by the Rollers. (Trial Tr., 
Vol. Ill, p. 5). 
POINT SIX 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED EVIDENCE 
OF THE VALUE OF HUNTING ACCESS PERMITS AS A 
SEPARATE ELEMENT OF COMPENSABLE DAMAGES. 
The Rollers asserted that the highest and best use of the 
property to be condemned was as a cultivated dry farm with wild 
life resources. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p. 25). Contrary to the 
Rollers' assertion in their brief, they were allowed to put on 
extensive evidence regarding the wild life potential of the 
property. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, pp. 76-82). They were allowed 
to put on evidence that the deer herd on the property added to 
the total value of the property and was one of the factors to 
be considered in determining fair market value. (Trial Tr., 
Vol. I, p. 85). 
Mr. Roller testified that approximately 300 head of deer 
were on his property and that anywhere from 50 to 100 fawn 
would be produced a year. There was testimony that permits to 
hunt on the property could be sold. (Trial Tr., Vol. Ill, 
pp. 16-17). The Rollers' appraiser testified that exclusive 
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use was necessary in order to sell access permits, and Mr. 
Roller testified that exclusive use would be destroyed by the 
condemnation. (Trial Tr., Vol. Ill, p. 21). The court held 
that the Rollers were entitled to show what a willing buyer on 
August 5, 1986 would pay for the property and that after the 
taking a willing buyer would pay less for the remaining 
property because of the damage done by reason of the taking to 
the potential value of the hunting rights. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, 
p. 87). The Rollers' appraiser, using an income approach, 
calculated that the value of the wildlife resource was 
$52,740. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p. 91, Vol. II, p. 66). 
The only evidence on that issue which was excluded was the 
testimony by Shane Davis, an employee of Deseret Land and 
Livestock Company. The court sustained an objection to the 
introduction of income and expense figures for Deseret Land and 
Livestock on the grounds that the two properties were not 
comparable. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p. 93). 
A given piece of land has only one market value and not a 
certain market value for one purpose and a different market 
value for another purpose. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake 
City v. Barrutia, 526 P.2d 47, 49 (Utah 1974). The jury is 
permitted to consider in determining fair market value, the 
highest and most profitable use for which the property is 
adaptable to the extent that the prospect of demand for such 
use affects the market value. State v. 7.026 Acres, 466 P.2d 
364, 366 (Alaska 1970). In State v. 7.026 Acres, the court 
held that: 
Such adaptability, merely within the realm of 
possibility is not sufficient. It must be shown that 
the use for which the property is claimed to be 
adaptable is reasonably probable. If this cannot be 
shown, evidence of prospective use must be excluded 
because it would allow mere conjecture and speculation 
to become a guide for ascertainment of value, and this 
is not a permissible method for the judicial ascertain-
ment of truth. 
Id. at 366. 
It can certainly be argued that the Rollers should not have 
been allowed to introduce any evidence on the value of the deer 
herd. Rollers' valuation calculation was arrived at by an 
income approach using the potential sale of hunting access 
permits. Prior to the date of taking, however, the Rollers had 
never received a fee from anyone for hunting deer on the 
property. (Trial Tr., Vol. Ill, P. 119). Ordinarily 
subsequent occurrences are not admissible to determine value. 
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Mitsui Investment, 
Inc., supra, 522 P.2d at 1372. The prospective use of the 
property for the sale of hunting access permits is based on 
conjecture and speculation and should not be a determinant of 
value. 
The Rollers were not entitled to put on a separate 
calculation of the loss of business potential based upon the 
future use of the property for the sale of hunting access 
permits. They had already placed into evidence testimony 
regarding the incremental increase in the fair market value of 
the property based upon an income calculation for the use of 
the wildlife resource. The defendants are not entitled to a 
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valuation of the use of the property for hunting access permits 
independently of the land of which it is a part. The land was 
valued with the wildlife resource given due consideration as a 
component part of the land. See State v. Noble/ 6 Utah 2d 40, 
305 P.2d 495, 498 (1957). In Noble, the court stated that: 
courts have with great unanimity rejected the 
proposition that just compensation is the equivalent 
of the total profits which would be realized from the 
future operations of the property. The measure of 
damages is (said to be) the market value of the 
property and not the output thereof. The accepted 
formula for determining fair market value is not how 
much would the property produce over a period of 
fifteen years, but what would a purchaser willing to 
buy but not required to do so pay, and what would a 
seller willing to sell but not required to do so, ask. 
Id. at 498. 
In State v. Ouzounian, 26 Utah 2d 442, 491 P.2d 1093 
(1971), the court held that business profits are not the 
subject of independent compensation aside and apart from the 
market value of the land seized, upon which the business has 
been conducted. _Id. at 1095. The court held that such a 
calculation would be remote and speculative to be used as the 
criterion of the market value of the land upon which such 
business was conducted. _Id. at 1095. 
Thus, although the court allowed the defendants to 
introduce evidence as to the impact of the wildlife resource on 
the fair market value of the property, it properly disallowed 
evidence of speculative future lost profits for use of the land 
through the sale of hunting access permits. 
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POINT SEVEN 
COSTS, INCLUDING THE COSTS OF PREPARATION OF 
TRANSCRIPTS AND EXHIBITS, WERE PROPERLY NOT 
AWARDED. 
The trial court properly refused to award the costs 
requested by the Rollers of $2,252.65. The court, however, 
awarded the Rollers $74.00 in costs constituting the amount of 
the jury fee and a witness fee. The court properly disallowed 
the balance of the expenses sought. The court held that the 
remaining expenses sought by the Rollers, including $1,468.00 
for photographs, were not properly taxable as costs. (Hearing 
Tr. 3-23-88, p. 12). 
Costs are those fees which are required to be paid to the 
court and to witnesses and for which the statutes authorize 
inclusion in the judgment. Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 
774 (Utah 1980). They are generally allowable only in the 
amounts and in the manner provided by statute. The expenses 
sought by the appellants do not fall within the category of 
authorized costs. Utah courts have distinguished between 
legitimate and taxable "costs" and other "expenses" of 
litigation which may be necessary but are not properly taxable 
as costs. :id- Only the former are properly recoverable. 
In Frampton, the court held that expenses for a model, 
photographs and certified copies of documents necessary to 
present plaintiff's case were not properly taxable as costs. 
Id. at 774. In Hatanaka v. Struhs, 738 P.2d 1052 (Utah App. 
1987), the court held that the cost of a survey the owner had 
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conducted and which was necessary to assist in the preparation 
of the case could not be recovered by the owner as a "cost" and 
that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding 
plaintiff the costs relating to the survey. _Id. at 1055. See 
Stratford v. Wood, 11 Utah 2d 251, 358 P.2d 80, 81 (1961) 
(survey cost made in preparation of plaintiff's case not in the 
nature of costs or damages). Thus, Rollers' argument that they 
should be awarded their expenses as taxable costs because the 
expenses were necessarily incurred in order to present their 
case should be rejected. Whether or not the expenses were 
incurred in order to present the case is not the issue. The 
issue is whether the costs were required to be paid to the 
court or to witnesses and in this case they were not. 
Most importantly, however, the trial court has broad 
discretion in connection with the grant or denial of costs. 
The court has a duty to guard against any excesses or abuses in 
the taking thereof. Frampton v. Wilson, supra, 605 P.2d at 
773-74. Here, the court property guarded against excess and 
abuse by denying appellants' request for an award of $2,252.65 
in costs. The trial court certainly did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to award as costs the expenses claimed 
by the appellants and this court should not reverse the trial 
court's determination on the award of costs since no abuse of 
discretion has been shown. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent, Cornish Town, respectfully submits that the 
decision of the trial court should be affirmed in all respects 
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